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RECENT DECISIONS
APPLICATION OF THE NEw YoRx ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL LAW
TO MAIL ORDER LIQUOR TRANSACTIONS
The province of this study is an exegesis of the issues raised in recent
judicial determinations focusing upon the New York State Alcoholic Beverage
Control law.' But the reader will realize at the outset, in view of the extensive
publicity accorded of late to practices of the State Liquor Authority,2 the
reports of the New York State Moreland Commission on the Alcoholic Bever-
age Control law3 and the passage of a reform bill by the state legislature,4 that
he is not confronted by legal problems which can be deliberated in vacuo.
Rather, the ultimate question is whether or not there should be further changes
in the governing statute both as to purpose and as to the regulatory devices to
achieve that purpose. A long history of legislative controls, founded in part
on pre-prohibition and prohibition concepts, and the economic interests nur-
tured and protected by statutory restrictions have, in combination, proved
highly resistant to any modification. In a realistic sense, therefore, the plain-
tiffs who in the current cases argued against certain prohibitions of the law
laid the challenge more appropriately at the steps of the statehouse than the
courthouse.
The succeeding discussion will lay the background of statutory controls,
examine the general purpose and pertinent provisions of the ABC law, present
the facts and issues of the cases under review and finally, relate such issues to
legal and legislative problems.
1. Hereinafter cited as the ABC Law. This law was originally enacted as N.Y. Sess,
Laws 1934, ch. 478.
2. Hereinafter cited as the SLA.
3. There have been more than fifty Moreland Commissions, authorized by section 6
of the N. Y. State Executive Law. All references in this paper, however, are to the present
Commission on the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law, hereinafter cited as the Moreland
Commission.
The governor of the state of New York on February 18, 1963, appointed Lawrence
E. Walsh as chairman and Manly Fleischmann and William C. Warren as commissioners
to make a "thorough study and reappraisal of the law with respect to the sale and dis-
tribution of alcoholic beverages in the State ... in the light of experience and current
social and economic conditions." The Commission has published the following Reports
and Study Papers: The Relationship of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law and the
Problems of Alcohol, Study Paper No. 1 (Oct. 18, 1963); The Relationship between the
Number of Sales Outlets and the Consumption of Alcoholic Beverages in New York and
Other States, Study Paper No. 2 (Oct. 21, 1963); The Relationship between the Number
of Off-Premise Licenses and the Consumption of Alcoholic Beverages: A Statistical Analysis,
Study Paper No. 3 (Oct. 21, 1963); Some Economic and Regulatory Aspects of Liquor
Store Licensing in New York State: A Summary of Research, Study Paper No. 4 (Oct.
27, 1963); Resale Price Maintenance in the Liquor Industry, Study Paper No. 5 (Oct. 28,
1963); The Licensing and Regulation of Retail Package Liquor Stores, Report and Recom-
mendations No. 1 (Jan. 3, 1964); The Food Requirements in Bars and Grills, Report and
Recommendations No. 2 (Jan. 9, 1964); Mandatory Resale Price Maintenance, Report
and Recommendations No. 3 (Jan. 21, 1964).
4. Reform bills were introduced in the state legislature in February 1964. The legisla-
tive defeat of any change on March 26, 1964 prompted the governor to call a special
session on April 15. On April 16, a broad revision was adopted. See note 90 infra.
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I. REGULATION OF INTOXICATING LIQUORS
Federal Controls
Chronologically, one may begin the survey of federal enactments governing
intoxicating liquors5 with the Wilson Act 6 which provided that upon importa-
tion into a state, intoxicating liquors are "subject to the operation and effect
of the laws of such State . . . enacted in the exercise of its police powers to
the same extent as though such . . . liquors had been produced in such
State. . . ." This act established the control of the state of destination as to
liquor transported through interstate commerce. The Webb-Kenyon Act7 with-
drew from intoxicating liquors the protection of the commerce clause, by pro-
hibiting their importation into any state in violation of state law forbidding
the use therein of such liquors. The Reed Amendment 8 prohibited the trans-
portation by interstate commerce of liquors into any state in violation of state
laws forbidding the manufacture or sale of intoxicating liquors. Thus, the right
of an individual to place such liquors in the stream of interstate commerce
was conditioned upon the laws of the state of receipt; if the state forbade use,
manufacture or sale within its borders, Congress had declared the channels of
interstate commerce closed to shipments. The emerging purpose of these acts
of Congress, even before passage of the twenty-first amendment, was to permit
and assist state regulation of intoxicating liquors.
The twenty-first amendment, section 29 established state control as part
of the Constitution by providing:
The transportation or importation into any State, Territory or pos-
session of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating
liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.
Supreme Court decisions have held that the sweep of the twenty-first amend-
ment may not be impaired by opposing the commerce clause,10 the supremacy
clause" or the fourteenth amendment.12
S. Annot., 155 A.L.R. 816 (1945).
6. Act of Aug. 8, 1890, 26 Stat. 313, 27 U.S.C. § 121 (1958).
7. Act of March 1, 1913, ch. 90, 37 Stat. 669, re-enacted by Act of Aug. 27, 1935,
49 Stat. 877, 27 U.S.C. § 122 (1958).
8. Post Office Appropriation Act of March 3, 1917, 39 Stat. 1069.
9. Effective Dec. 5, 1933.
10. "As a matter of constitutional law, the result of the Twenty-first Amendment is
that a State may erect any barrier it pleases to the entry of intoxicating liquors. Its
barriers may be low, high or insurmountable. Of course, if a State chooses not to exercise
the power given it by the Twenty-first Amendment and to continue to treat intoxicating
liquors like other articles, the operation of the Commerce Clause continues. [The Commerce
Clause] . . . must yield to state power drawn from the Twenty-first Amendment." Justice
Frankfurter, concurring in United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, 324 U.S. 293, 300-01
(1945). See also Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132, 138 (1939); Nippert v. Richmond,
327 U.S. 416, 425 (1946); Duckworth v. Arkansas, 314 U.S. 390, 398-99 (1941) (Jackson,
J., concurring). Cf., Carter v. Virginia, 321 U.S. 131, 138 (1944) (Black, J., concurring).
11. See Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132, 140 (1939) (by implication).
12. See Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132, 140 (1939); Indianapolis Brewing Co. v.
Liquor Control Commission, 305 U.S. 391, 394 (1939); Mahoney v. Triner Corp., 304 U.S.
401, 403 (1938); State Board of Equalization of California v. Young's Market Co., 299
U.S. 59, 64 (1936). For analysis of the "rational basis" test of economic regulation as a
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In consonance with the twenty-first amendment, the Federal Alcoholic
Administration Act of 193513 laid down the requirement that any applicant for
a permit to engage in interstate liquor traffic must comply with the laws of the
state in which he operates.
Of major importance to producers, distributors and consumers of intoxicat-
ing liquors is the provision in the Internal Revenue Code' 4 of a federal tax of
$10.50 per gallon on all distilled spirits produced in or imported into the United
States. This tax represents a substantial portion of the resale price and a
primary target for evasion.
Lastly, the federal regulatory scheme includes a statute directly in point
in the cases to be examined because of its "Free List" provisions. Paragraph
1798 of 19 U.S.C. section 120115 permits a returning resident to import not
more than one gallon of alcoholic beverages duty free when
. . . acquired abroad as an incident of the journey from which he is
returning, for personal . . . use, but not imported for the account of
any other person nor intended for sale. .... 10
New York State Controls
The Alcoholic Beverage Control law was enacted in 1934, following repeal
of the eighteenth amendment. It created the State Liquor Authority, a quasi-
judicial agency17 with broad discretionary powers18 to "adopt rules and regu-
lations . . . to foster and promote temperance, and provide for the orderly
distribution of alcoholic beverages .... "19
The purpose of the statute is set forth in section 2:
It is hereby declared as the policy of the state that it is necessary to
regulate and control the manufacture, sale and distribution within the
state of alcoholic beverages for the purpose of fostering and promoting
temperance in their consumption and respect for and obedience to
law. It is hereby declared that such policy will best be carried out by
empowering the liquor authority . . . to determine whether public
convenience and advantage will be promoted by the issuance of li-
censes to traffic in alcoholic beverages, . . . and the location of
premises licensed thereby. . . . The restrictions, regulations and pro-
visions . . . are enacted . . . for the protection, health, welfare and
safety of the people of the state.20
means to surmount due process barriers, see Hyman, Judicial Standards for the Protection
of Basic Freedoms, 1 Buffalo L. Rev. 221, 235-39 (1952), and Stern, The Problems of
Yesteryear-Commerce and Due Process, 4 Vand. L. Rev. 446, 449 (1951).
13. 49 Stat. 977, 27 U.S.C. § 204(a) (2) (C) (1958).
14. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 5001(a) (1).
15. The Act of June 26, 1936 inserted the exemption for distilled spirits.
16. See for interpretation of the statute vis-h-vis state regulation, Wylie v. State
Board of Equalization of California, 21 F. Supp. 604, 605 (S.D. Cal. 1937).
17. Roden v. New York SLA, 17 N.Y.S.2d 352 (Sup. Ct. 1939) (dictum), rev'd on
other grounds, 248 App. Div. 1076, 18 N.Y.S.2d 69 (2d Dep't 1940).
18. Yates v. Mulrooney, 245 App. Div. 146, 281 N.Y. Supp. 216 (4th Dep't 1935)
(dictum).
19. ABC Law § 17(12).
20. See generally In re Bay Ridge Inn, 94 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1938); Trustees of Cal-
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The two most controversial aspects of the comprehensive regulatory system
detailed by the statute-resale price maintenanceP' and the moratorium on
package store licenses effective since 194822 -are not, patently, in issue in the
litigations hereinafter examined; nonetheless they are unmistakably interwoven
in the whole cloth from which these individual controversies are cut.28
The particular provisions of the ABC law which are germane to the recent
decisions involving the SLA concern the sale and distribution of alcoholic
beverages. The law sets forth a broad definition of "sale." 24 It should be noted
that the acts of agents are specifically covered and that solicitation of orders
and delivery are included. The law also reaches "traffic in" alcoholic beverages,
defining this term as the manufacture and sale at wholesale or retail.25 The
control of all of these activities is bottomed on a licensing scheme whereby the
individual must apply and pay for permission to engage in the liquor business.
The activity is a privilege rather than a right,26 and the SLA is empowered to
grant, deny and revoke licenses.2 7
Section 100(1) requires any person manufacturing for sale or selling at
wholesale or retail to obtain a license. Licenses are also required for activities
peripheral to manufacture and sale. Thus, one may not legally solicit an order
within the state for alcoholic beverages, whether or not the sale is to be con-
cluded in New York, without possessing a solicitor's permit.2 8 And, conformably,
one may not cause to be sent into or to be issued within the state any publica-
tion advertising or soliciting orders for alcoholic beverages unless licensed to
"traffic in" such beverages.29 Alcoholic beverages may be stored only upon
premises for which a license or a permit has been obtained from the SLA.30
Furthermore, transportation of liquor within the state must be by a truck for
which a permit has been obtained31 or by a vehicle owned (or hired) and
operated by a licensee.3 2 But certain exceptions, contained in section 116, to
the licensing requirement for transportation should be noted:
vary Presbyterian Church v. SLA, 245 App. Div. 176, 281 N.Y. Supp. 81 (4th Dep't 1935),
aff'd, 270 N.Y. 497, 200 N.E. 288 (1936); Yates v. Mulrooney, 245 App. Div. 146, 281
N.Y. Supp. 216 (4th Dep't 1935).
21. Moreland Commission, Mandatory Resale Price Maintenance, Reports and Recom-
mendation No. 3 (Jan. 21, 1964). See comment of the new law infra note 90.
22. Moreland Commission, Some Economic and Regulatory Aspects of Liquor Store
Licensing in New York State: A Summary of Research, Study Paper No. 4 (Oct. 27, 1963).
See note 90 infra.
23. See Part II infra.
24. "'Sale' means any transfer, exchange or barter . . . by any means whatsoever for
a consideration, [including] . . . all sales made by any person, whether principal, pro-
prietor, agent, servant or employee. . . . 'To sell' includes to solicit or receive an order for,
to keep or expose for sale, and to keep with intent~to sell and shall include the delivery of
any alcoholic beverage in the state." ABC Law § 3 (28).
25. ABC Law § 3(30).
26. In re Bay Ridge Inn, 94 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1938).
27. ABC Law §§ 17(1),(3), and 118.
28. ABC Law § 93(1).
29. ABC Law § 102(1)(a),(b).
30. ABC Law § 96(1).
31. ABC Law § 94(1).
32. ABC Law § 116.
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(a) that alcoholic beverages may be transported by a retail licensee
to the home of a purchaser not to be resold by the purchaser;
(b) that alcoholic beverages owned by a person may be transported
from place to place not for purposes of sale;
(c) that alcoholic beverages may be delivered from a licensee to a
steamship or railroad station or terminal for purposes of trans-
portation, and may be delivered from a steamship or railroad
station or terminal to a purchaser for purposes of consumption,
or to a licensee by any bona fide trucking agency holding a permit
under this chapter.
Finally, the regulations most prominently involved in recent decisions are
found in section 102(1):
(c) No alcoholic beverages shall be shipped into the state unless the
same shall be consigned to a person duly licensed hereunder to
traffic in alcoholic beverages.
(d) No common carrier or other person shall bring or carry into the
state any alcoholic beverages, unless the same shall be consigned
to a person duly licensed hereunder to traffic in alcoholic bever-
ages.33
Section 102(1) (c) is the springboard for the administrative ruling of the
SLA, Bulletin No. 35934 which was directly at issue in American Travelers
Club, Inc. v. Hostetter.35 This Bulletin, addressed to common carriers of pas-
sengers and freight, revoked a previous administrative ruling8" which had per-
mitted returning residents to import one gallon or less of alcoholic beverages
"to follow" without obtaining a permit from the SLA. This earlier regulation
was consonant with the federal "Free List" provision 87 permitting a returning
resident to import one gallon duty free. In issuing Bulletin No. 359, the SLA
determined upon a strict construction and enforcement of section 102 (1) (c) by
prohibiting a shipment of any quantity of liquor to an unlicensed consignee.
Inherent in the present controversies over the validity of Bulletin No. 359
are not only the problems, such as expense, inconvenience (or in some cases
impossibility) of obtaining the required license, but also, the licensee's duty
to pay the state tax on alcoholic beverages. The current rate is forty-five cents
on each one-fifth of intoxicating liquors. On those defined as distributors under
the Tax Law,38 the state places a responsibility for filing monthly returns and
paying therewith the tax due on each gallon of beverages sold.80
33. Subdivision (e) of § 102(1) extends these two provisions to beverages intended
for personal use and to interstate and intrastate carriage. The court in the Matter of
Wylegala, 177 Misc. 1071, 32 N.Y.S.2d 814 (Sup. Ct. 1942), aff'd, 264 App. Div. 937, 36
N.Y.S.2d 440 (4th Dep't 1942) found a "patent contradiction" in considering these three
subdivisions, and offered no guide as to the manner in which they could be consistently
construed.
34. Effective March 1, 1963.
35. 219 F. Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
36. Bulletin No. 263, effective July 20, 1954.
37. 19 U.S.C. § 1201, ff 1798 (1958).
38. N.Y. Tax Law § 420(4).
39. N.Y. Tax Law § 429.
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II. THE CASES
People v. Tourists Int'l, S.A.
Essenfeld Bros. v. Hostetter40
In the first action, the Attorney General sought to enjoin Tourists Inter-
national from soliciting and from distributing order kits to departing residents
for the purchase of duty free liquor. In the second action, Essenfeld Bros. and
the Railway Express Agency, both carriers holding permits from the SLA,
sought a declaratory judgment and .an injunction against the SLA for inter-
ference with their delivery of tourists' purchases in New York following the
promulgation of Bulletin No. 359. The following analysis will concentrate on
the facts of the Essenfeld-Railway Express case since the major issues were
developed in that litigation.41
Both plaintiffs had been engaged since 1957-58 in delivering to resident-
purchasers (who, as consignors, shipped to themselves as consignees) duty free
liquor as permitted under 19 U.S.C. section 1201, paragraph 1798. In 1962,
Essenfeld had delivered approximately 30,000 gallons and Railway Express,
40,000 gallons.42 The procedure for placing orders was detailed in the "order
kits" supplied by plaintiffs and others.43 The prospective traveler fills out an
order form and mails it with his check while he is outside the U.S. to the
foreign order firm and simultaneously to a Swiss bank. On returning, the
purchaser secures United States Customs Form 3351 and mails this to a
foreign agent of Railway Express. The Swiss bank deposits the check to the
account of the mail order firm and forwards the order to suppliers who ar-
range for delivery in New York via Railway Express Agency.44
The gravamen of the Essenfeld cause of action was the alleged unconstitu-
tionality of section 102(1) (c) of the ABC law and Bulletin No. 359. By ab-
solutely forbidding common carriers to ship liquor in any amount to an un-
40. 40 Misc. 2d 99, 242 N.Y.S.2d 756 (Sup. Ct. 1963), rev'd, 20 A.D.2d 34, 245
N.Y.S.2d 291 (1st Dep't 1963), rev'd, 14 N.Y.2d 47, 197 N.E.2d 535, 248 N.Y.S.2d 45
(1964).
41. Attached to and made part of the complaint in this case were the papers in other
actions brought by the Attorney General involving as defendants, Essenfeld, Railway
Express, Intramerica Export, Inc. and Poole's, Ltd.
42. Brief for Defendants-Appellants, p. 4 (Hereinafter cited as Attorney General's
Brief).
43. A sample of the accompanying advertising was introduced by counsel for the
SLA: "Leaving the U.S.A.? Duty-Free Liquor delivered to your home by Poole's Ltd.
world-wide bonded spirits merchants and Railway Express Agency.... Poole's Ltd ..
in cooperation with Railway Express Agency guarantees delivery to your home, handles
all packing, shipping, customs clearance and insurance for you .... You may order 5
bottles (fifths) for each member of your family travelling with you." Attorney General's
Brief, pp. 11-12. The forms contained no caveat against placing orders for minors, and
counsel for the SLA cited the case of a resident returning over the Whirlpool Rapids Bridge
at Niagara Falls with his three daughters, and declaring the following liquors to be shipped
on an order sent to Switzerland (in care of Railway Express); 10 bottles of Canadian
Club and 5 bottles of Hiram Walker. The daughters were under six years of age. Attorney
General's Brief, pp. 12-13.
44. Essenfeld Bros. v. Hostetter, 40 Misc. 2d 99, 100-01, 242 N.Y.S.2d 756, 758
(Sup. Ct. 1963); Attorney General's Brief, p. 6.
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licensed person, the SLA was, according to plaintiff's contention, applying the
statute in violation of his rights to due process and equal protection and was
abusing the police power of the state. The Attorney General's answer alleged
the violation by plaintiffs of section 102(1) (a-d), the constitutionality of the
statute as applied and the deleterious effect of plaintiffs' operations on the
resale price maintenance policy of the state.45
The plaintiffs won a summary judgment at Special Term without the
court's reaching the issue of constitutionality. The judgment was based on the
court's conclusion that the sales of the alcoholic beverages were consummated
outside the state of New York. The characterization of the sale being a pivotal
fact in these cases, it is important to note the attributes of the transaction in
Essenjeld: the order was placed and received outside the United States; pay-
ment was remitted and received outside the United States; the liquor was
appropriated to the contract outside the United States. Finding that title
passed with the act of appropriating liquor to the purchaser's individual order,
the court determined that the advertising and solicitation in question con-
cerned beverages sold outside the state. The ABC law did not bar such opera-
tions since the legislative purpose contemplated only regulation within the
state.
46
With respect to the delivery operations of plaintiffs, the court at Special
Term found clear authorization in the act and declared that section 102 could
not be interpreted to derogate from the rights granted in another provision of
the law, section 116(c). 4 7 Secondly, since a returning resident might lawfully
carry home with him a gallon of liquor (without contravening the regulatory
purpose of the state), he might just as lawfully and consistently hire out the
delivery to a carrier to transport the liquor from the ship to his home. In so
doing, the carrier would be merely the agent of the purchaser who, under the
court's analysis of the sale, would have acquired title well before the time of
delivery. Parenthetically, the earlier passing of title would also protect the
transaction from classification as "commercial importation," which the law
was intended to prohibit. 48
The argument of the Attorney General on appeal 40 stressed a variety of
points: that unlicensed solicitation was barred whether a transaction was con-
templated within or without the state;5 0 that title did not pass until comple-
45. Answering affidavit opposing plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, Attorney
General's Brief, pp. 14-15.
46. Essenfeld Bros. v. Hostetter, 40 Misc. 2d 99, 103, 242 N.Y.S.2d 756, 760 (Sup,
Ct. 1963).
47. This provision allows permitees to deliver from transportation terminals to
ultimate consumers, without a requirement that the consumer be licensed.
48. People v. Ryan, 274 N.Y. 149, 154, 8 N.E.2d 313, 316 (1937).
49. Although the state prevailed in the Appellate Division, but not in the Court of
Appeals, the Attorney General raised issues similar to those in American Travelers Club,
Inc. v. Hostetter, 219 F. Supp. 95 -(S.D.N.Y. 1963), also adumbrating the State's arguments
in any future analogous litigation.
50. ABC Law § 102(1) (a),(b) 'and § 93(1) providing: "No individual shall offer for
sale or solicit any order in the state . . . irrespective of whether such sale is to be made,
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tion of delivery and, a fortiori, plaintiffs could not'qualify as agents in the
transaction;6 1 that plaintiffs as licensees lacked standing to attack the con-
stitutionality of the ABC law; 52 that plaintiffs raised no substantial constitu-
tional questions;5 3 that there were no exemptions to the clear prohibition of
section 102(1) (c) against shipments into the state destined for unlicensed con-
signees.
In reversing the Appellate Division 54 and affirming Special Term's sum-
mary judgment for Essenfeld and Railway Express, Judge Fuld5 5 confined the
holding to subdivisions (1) (c) and (1) (d) of section 102 as applied to plain-
tiffs' shipping activities.56 The reasoning in the instant appeal paralleled the
approach of the court in the leading case of People v. Ryan.57
In Ryan, a New York resident bought eleven bottles of wine and one
bottle of hard liquor in a Connecticut store near the state line. He transported
the liquor in his car to New York. It was established by the facts that defend-
ant owned the liquor and that it was intended for his personal use. In affirm-
ing dismissal of the indictment charging violation of section 102(1) (d) 58 the
Court of Appeals applied the doctrine of ejusdem generis in construing "no
common carrier or other person" (emphasis supplied) to mean "no other
person engaged in commercial transportation of goods owned by or consigned,
to others" 59 and thereby exempted from the licensing requirement the in-
dividual purchaser who carried beverages into the state for his private con-
sumption60
By a "parity of reasoning," the Court of Appeals in Essenfeld found that
within or without the state, unless such person shall have a solicitor's permit." See Dela-
meter v. South Dakota, 205 U.S. 93 (1907); Premier-Pabst Sales Co. v. State Board of
Equalization, 13 F. Supp. 90 (S.D. Cal. 1936).
51. The vendor's guarantee of safe delivery constituted "a condition precedent to title
passing to the purchaser under Rule 5 of § 100 of the Personal Property Law." Attorney
General's Brief, p. 33. This may be compared with the refutation of the agency argument
in American Travelers Club, Inc. v. Hostetter, 219 F. Supp. 95, 104 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
52. See Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947).
53. Citing United States v. Renken, 55 F. Supp. 1, 6-7 (W.D.S.C. 1944), affd, 147
F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 734 (1945); Mahoney v. Triner Corp., 304
U.S. 401, 404 (1938); State Board of Equalization of California v. Young's Market Co.,
299 U.S. 59 (1936), -to the effect that the due process, equal protection and commerce
clauses may not be raised as bars to state control of importation resting on section 2 of
the twenty-first amendment.
54. 20 A.D.2d 34, 245 N.Y.S.2d 291 (1st Dep't 1963), rev'd, 14 N.Y.2d 47, 197 N.E.2d
535, 248 N.Y.S.2d 45 (1964).
55. Three judges dissented.
56. In holding that the importation in the instant case did not violate the ABC Law,
judge Fuld observed that the state's interpretation of § 102(1) (c) would ascribe "a mean-
ing at odds with the explicit language" of § 116(c), permitting an agency, such as plaintiffs,
to deliver to an unlicensed consumer.
57. 274 N.Y. 149, 8 N.E.2d 313 (1937). It should be noted that § 116 was part of the
ABC Law, including the exemption of deliveries to purchasers for purposes of consumption,
essentially in its present form at the time of the Ryan decision.
58. "No common carrier or other person shall bring . . .into the state any alcoholic
beverages, unless the same shall be consigned to a person duly licensed ... 
59. 274 N.Y. 149, 154, 8 N.E.2d 313, 316 (1937).
60. "Literal meanings of words are not to be adhered to or suffered to 'defeat the
general purpose and manifest policy intended to be promoted .. . .' " People v. Ryan,
274 N.Y. 149, 152, 8 N.E.2d 313, 315 (1937).
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section 102(1)(c) 61 applied to shipments into the state for the purpose of
resale, and mandated that such imports be consigned to licensed dealers. The
pervasive purpose of the legislature was the control of manufacture, sale and
distribution and not of personal use of alcoholic beverages.0 2 In so construing
section 102(1) (c), the Court discounted any impairment of the basic "foster-
ing of temperance" policy underlying the ABC law and observed:
It borders on naivet6 to suggest that, by forbidding carriers to deliver
liquor purchased-incidentally, at lower prices-outside the country,
temperance would be promoted because people required to carry pack-
ages with them would forego making such purchases.0 3
This view, in the light of the substantial volume of importation from Canadian
sources, is obviously not shared by licensed retailers and wholesalers in New
York whose sales are diminished as a consequence. Finally, although the
opinion contains no direct statement that the SLA's Bulletin No. 359 is in-
valid, the Court leaves no doubt that a gallon of duty-free liquor "to follow,"
acquired in an out-of-state transaction, may be imported by an unlicensed
consignor-consignee for personal use.
American Travelers Club, Inc. v. Hostetter
64
This action, like the Essenfeld case, sought a declaratory judgment and
an injunction against the SLA to restrain enforcement of Bulletin No. 359.
The complaint alleged that the administrative ruling was contrary to the
ABC law and was in violation of plaintiff's rights under 19 U.S.C. section
1201, paragraph 1798 and under the commerce, supremacy, due process, privi-
leges and immunities and equal protection clauses of the federal Constitution.
Judge Medina for the three judge statutory Court 5 dismissed the complaint
on the merits.
The plaintiff, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business
near Idewild Airport conducted operations in the following manner. 0 It pre-
61. "No alcoholic beverages shall be shipped into the state unless the same shall be
consigned to a person duly licensed hereunder to traffic in alcoholic beverages."
62. 14 N.Y.2d 47, 53, 197 N.E.2d 535, 538, 248 N.Y.S.2d 45, 49 (1964).
63. 14 N.Y.2d 47, 54, 197 N.E.2d 535, 538, 248 N.Y.S.2d 45, 49 (1964). Portions of
the Attorney General's Brief challenge this view: "The Legislature may well have deter-
mined to impose no bar to casual bringing in of the limited amount of alcoholic beverages
as held permissible in the Ryan case, and to absolutely bar the importation by shipping of
such beverages," and call attention to another purpose of the ABC Law jeopardized by
the tremendous mail-order business. "Since the prices paid to these vendors by New York
residents are approximately one-half of the minimum consumer resale prices which New
York's licensed retail dealers are required to charge pursuant to § 101-c, the havoc to New
York's regulation of the liquor traffic . . . is clearly evident .... " Attorney General's
Brief, p. 20.
64. 219 F. Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
65. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281, 2284 (1958).
66. Contrast with the facts in IdIewild Bon-Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 212
F. Supp. 376 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). In that case, plaintiff sold tax free liquor to passengers as
they departed from New York. Passengers paid for the liquor before boarding their plane;
the purchased liquor was also transported on the plane, but released to the purchasers
only after landing abroad. The court held that the state could not prohibit this commercial
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pared and supplied "order kits" soliciting orders (with a maximum of five
fifths per household member) from prospective New York travelers. The
order and remittance, made payable to plaintiffs, were to be mailed to the
plaintiff in New York from outside the United States. Plaintiff thereupon
deposited the checks in its own New York bank account and forwarded its
draft with the orders to a Belgian supplier. The latter packaged and addressed
the individual orders and shipped them in large containers to plaintiff as
consignee. Plaintiff arranged for customs clearance, and delivered the packages
in its own trucks to the purchasers. At times, the orders were stored overnight
on plaintiff's premises. By the terms of the sale, the foreign supplier paid
freight, shipping and insurance costs to New York, and the plaintiff guaranteed
safe delivery to the address of the purchaser in New York.
67
In analyzing plaintiff's business practices with respect to New York law,
the Court easily discovered specific violations; viz., unlicensed solicitation,68
receipt of shipments by an unlicensed consignee, 69 sales by an unlicensed
retailer or wholesaler, 70 unlicensed transportation for distribution within the
state7' and unlicensed storage.72 These findings were predicated to a large
extent on the Court's rejection of plaintiff's contention that he was merely
the purchaser's agent and that title passed directly to the consumer from the
supplier.
Defendants had argued that state control over the importation of alcoholic
beverages did not hinge on the place of the sale since the twenty-first amend-
ment prohibited importation for "delivery or use therein" in contravention of
state law.73 It was argued, further, that the broad definition of sale in the
ABC law would encompass plaintiff's solicitation and delivery operations and
cast doubt upon the total effectuation of the sale outside the state. In the
Court's view, the evidence supported the conclusion that plaintiff took title
as consignee74 and was not acting primarily for the benefit of its purchasers.75
A "serious question" was raised by the contractual requirement that plaintiff
complete delivery to the purchaser's home or business address, in view of the
provisions of the New York Personal Property Law, section 100, rule 5.76 Thus,
operation on the grounds that there was no "delivery or use" in the state (twenty-first
amendment) and that the attempted regulation terminated commerce in violation of the
commerce clause.
67. American Travelers Club, Inc. v. Hostetter, 219 F. Supp. 9., 100-01 (S.D.N.Y.
1963) ; Defendants Memorandum of Law, pp. 2-5.
68. ABC Law § 102(1)(b).
69. ABC Law § 102(1)(c).
70. ABC Law § 100(1).
71. ABC Law §§ 94(1), 116(b).
72. ABC Law § 96(1).
73. Defendants' Memorandum of Law, p. 30.
74. American Travelers Club, Inc. v. Hostetter, 219 F. Supp. 95, 104 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
75. Ibid., citing Restatement (Second) Agency § 14 K (1958).
76. "Rules for ascertaining intention.-Unless a different intention appears, the fol-
lowing are rules for ascertaining the intention of the parties as to the time at which the
property in the goods is to pass to the buyer .... Rule 5-If the contract to sell requires
the seller to deliver the goods to the buyer, or at a particular place, or to pay freight or
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while the issue of the geographical and temporal point at which title passed
was not explicitly dispositive in the instant case, the Court underlined the
importance of this question.
Passing to the constitutional issues posed in the complaint, the Court
found the contentions to be without meri.t. The key position of the twenty-first
amendment in insulating state regulation of intoxicating liquors from the pro-
scriptions of the due process, commerce and equal protection clauses was affirmed
in general terms.77 Alternatively, the legal justification for state controls might
be viewed as a valid exercise of police powers.78 From either perspective, the
controls would have to meet the test of reasonableness. Where the test had
been met, the judiciary would not interpose these three constitutional rights to
invalidate state action which infringed upon, disrupted or even expunged a
complainant's business.
Perhaps the most provocative of plaintiff's arguments involving, tangenti-
ally, the supremacy and the privileges and immunities clauses of the constitu-
tion, was the claim to an affirmative federal right springing from the provision
in 19 U.S.C. section 1201, paragraph 1798. Plaintiff claimed, in effect, that he
could exercise this right on behalf of his customers to import one gallon per
individual duty free without regard to state law (and it might be interpolated,
without regard to the twenty-first amendment) or, alternatively, with regard
only to a previously effective, now superseded state administrative regulation,
Bulletin No. 263. 79 The latter permitted New York travelers to declare one
gallon as "following" them on their return and to receive it without obtaining
a permit. On the theory that what the federal government continues to "give"
and what the state has previously also "given" cannot thereafter be refused,80
plaintiff sought the vindication of his federal right by a judicial declaration
that Bulletin No. 359 contravened the supremacy and privileges and immunities
clauses of the Constitution. In dismissing this claim, the Court stated:
If Congress had intended to circumscribe such [state regulatory]
powers by creating an affirmative federal right to import liquor into
a state without regard to a state's prohibitions against such trans-
portation, we may assume that it would have employed language
more apt for that purpose than is found in the customs statute relied
upon by plaintiff.8'
The delicate question of whether a state law82 deriving from a clearly
cost of transportation to the buyer, or to a particular place, the property does not pass
until the goods have been delivered to the buyer or reached the place agreed upon."
77. See cases cited note 10 supra.
78. Carter v. Virginia, 321 U.S. 131, 139 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Duck-
worth v. Arkansas, 314 U.S. 390, 397 (1941) (Jackson, J., concurring).
79. The state characterized this Bulletin as "an exercise of administrative indulgence"
and a "casual indulgence to travelers" in denying that any right to import without a
permit was created. Defendants' Memorandum of Law, p. 27.
80. Id. at pp. 27-29.
81. American Travelers Club v. Hostetter, 219 F. Supp. 95, 106 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
82. ABC Law § 102(1)(c).
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identifiable constitutional matrix 3 may ascend to supersede a federal customs
statute84 of less exalted conception, was delicately avoided by Judge Medina.85
It is at least plausible that congressional regulation of the importation of in-
toxicating liquors might be grounded on an arsenal of constitutional powers-
the export-import, commerce and taxing clauses-to produce a statutory off-
spring as legally viable as a state regulation generated by the twenty-first
amendment.
III. RECONCILATION OF THE CASES
The Essenfeld case was decided in all three instances in the courts of New
York subsequent to the federal court's consideration of American Travelers
Club. In the former, Judge Sarafite at Special Term concluded his opinion with
the statement:
Finally, it should be made clear that this decision is not inconsistent
with American Travelers Club v. Hostetter. . . . [In that case] the
plaintiff was engaged in "an independent business whereby it pur-
chases liquor from a third party, taking title in its own name . ..
and that it was "engaged in the business of importing liquor for re-
sale," .... 81
But the businessman whose mail order operations serve New York customers,
and the state licensed liquor dealers whose economic fortunes are affected by
mail order sales might well be perturbed by practical questions: Does the
federal decision imply an absolute restriction upon unlicensed importation by
virtue of a broad interpretation of the reach of the ABC law and a literal
enforcement of Bulletin No. 359? Does the New York decision narrow Bul-
letin No. 359 as a control measure by finding it inapplicable where the two
critical factors-personal use and outside sale-coincide?
In neither case were constitutional guarantees available to deflect the
impact of state controls. In neither case were the statutory prohibitions found
vague or unreasonable. The divergence arose in the legal projection of the
controls-Essenfeld focusing sharply on commercial purposes, and American
Travelers Club sweeping a broader arc to encompass importation and use
within the state.
The mail order entrepreneur can presumably conduct his operations by
adhering to the business procedures in Essenfeld without running afoul of
Bulletin No. 359 or section 102(1) (c),(d), by making certain that all elements
of the sale are consummated without the state and that the purchaser can
legally qualify as consignor and consignee. Such intention could also be plainly
declared in the contract to discourage judicial resort to the statutory aides for
determining intent.87 However, the New York decision does not meet the issue
83. U.S. Const. Amend. XXI.
84. 19 U.S.C. § 1201, II 1798 (1958).
85. American Travelers Club, Inc. v. Hostetter, 219 F. Supp. 95, 107 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
86. Essenfeld Bros. v. Hostetter, 40 Misc. 2d 99, 105, 242 N.Y.S.2d 756, 762-63 (Sup.
Ct. 1963).
87. See note 76 supra. The Uniform Commercial Code, effective in New York on
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of the legality of other practices associated with the sale and it is assumed that
the state in future cases will seize upon each infraction of the ABC law. At
some point, the Court must either aid in the literal enforcement of these pro-
visions or extend the gloss now placed on section 102(1)(c),(d) to other
controls as well.
Those interested in preserving state restrictions will view Essenjeld as
officially condoning the gaping loophole developed -by the ingenuity of the
"outsiders" through which cut-price liquor may come into the state. The
licensees will be in accord with the "down the line" application of the statute
by the federal court. Does the difference in judicial approach hang on the
slender thread that in American Travelers Club the orders were placed with
an intermediary in New York and payments deposited in a New York bank,
while in Essenfeld, although the purchase was prompted by domestic solicita-
tion, all technicalities were concluded on foreign soil?88 This appears to be a
tenuous distinction since the ABC law purports to reach all sales regardless
of situs so long as the liquor enters the state for use and distribution therein.
It is submitted, rather, that the New York Court may be reading the
statute with an eye to current community judgment concerning the reasonable
scope of state regulation of intoxicating beverages. Such judgment would not
in general support controls categorized as temperance-promoting measures
whose practical consequence has been to place state enforcement machinery
behind retail prices fixed by the industry. Instead of invalidating the statute,
the New York Court has construed it in a more responsive manner.
If one projects present legal doubts concerning the validity or importance
of the distinctions which separate the two decisions, to a hypothetical, future
federal litigation where the terms of the sale do not, as in American Travelers
Club involve a clearly intrastate transaction, one is faced with the command
of Erie v. Tompkins.89 Under such circumstances, the federal court would be
obligated to apply the ABC law as construed by the highest court of this state.
The Essenjeld decision would seem to be in harmony with the present temper
of the legislature to constrict the area of control. Now that the initial assault
in a politically sensitive arena has been successfully waged, 90 the legislature
September 27, 1964 provides in § 2-401(2): "Unless otherwise explicitly agreed title passes
to the buyer at the time and place at which the seller completes his performance with
reference to the physical delivery of the goods, despite any reservation of a security in-
terest and even though a document of title is to be delivered at a different time or place
... ." (Emphasis added).
88. As a matter of record, see note 43 supra, were all elements of the sale completed
abroad since delivery was guaranteed to the.home of the purchaser in Essenfeld?
89. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
90. A bill, Senate Intro. 3, Print 3, amending the ABC Law, was enacted on April
16, 1964 at the Extraordinary Session of the N.Y. Legislature.
Section 64 was amended to provide (notwithstanding the power of the SLA to limit
the number of licenses under § 17(2) ) that any person may apply for a retail license
to sell liquor to be consumed on the premises and "such licenses shall be issued to all
applicants except for good cause shown."
A new section, 64-a, was added. Whereas previously, licenses for on-premises consump-
tion could be issued only to bona-fide restaurants, hotels, etc., the SLA may now issue
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might profitably make a reconnaisance of other problem areas in the law and
astutely complete the campaign.
JOSEPHINE Y. KING
CONDONATION AND THE NEW YORK SEPARATE ROOFS DEFENSE
If a wife sues for separation because, inter alla, of her husband's un-
doubted cruelty, and, after gaining a temporary support order which pre-
sumably covers shelter costs, continues to live in the same apartment with her
husband sharing the same bed, but without intercourse, for ten months, may
she get a final judgment? A recent New York supreme court case, Takagi v.
Takagi,' decided this issue in the negative. It was held that in such circum-
stances the wife had condoned her husband's transgressions so as to bar
relief.2 She did this by sharing the bed- and by electing to stay after an
opportunity for leaving was supposedly made available.3
"special licenses" to licensees who "regularly keep food available." Food is defined as
"sandwiches, soups or other foods." There is no requirement that the available food be
sold with the liquor.
Section 66 was amended to increase fees for retail licensees.
Section 101-b as amended, retains the definition of the stafe's policy--"to regulate and
control the manufacture, sale, and distribution within the State of alcoholic beverages for
the purpose of fostering and promoting temperance in their consumption and respect for
and obedience to the law." It also continues the prohibition against price discriminations in
sales to retailers and the requirement that brand owners file price schedules. However,
eight new paragraphs were added to § 101-b(3) specifying that a "duly verified affirmation"
must be filed with price schedules. The affirmation must declare that the prices set forth
are "no higher than the lowest prices" charged by the brand owner or other person to
any wholesaler or retailer anywhere in the U.S. during the preceding calendar month.
Criminal penalties are made available for false affirmations.
Section 101-bb was added to prohibit sales by retailers at less than cost. Section
101-bbb was added to continue SLA enforcement of minimum consumer prices (filed by
the manufacturer or wholesaler) of wine.
The addition of the last named section was necessitated by the repeal of § 101-c, the
general price maintenance section. Therefore, minimum consumer resale prices will be en-
forced for wine but no longer for liquor. In repealing § 101-c, the act declares "it is the
firm intention of the legislature (a) that fundamental principles of price competition should
prevail . . . , (b) that consumers of alcoholic beverages in this state should not be dis-
criminated against . . . by paying unjustifiably higher prices . . . than are paid by con-
sumers in other states . .. ."
Section 105(4),(4-a) was repealed to eliminate the minimum distance requirement
between package stores. But the minimum distance of two hundred feet between liquor
stores and churches and schools is retained.
Section 105(19) which previously applied only to sellers of beer was amended to
forbid price advertising by licensees selling beer or liquor for off-premises consumption.
The effective date for most of the additions noted above is October 31, 1964.
The new law does not contain revisions of the particular sections construed by the
courts in the cases examined in this study. However, the repeal of § 101-c can be expected
to affect the mail order business; liquor at prices lower than the current fixed scales will
be available within the state. The entire price advantage of imported liquors will not be
wiped out, because federal and state taxes will apply to domestic purchases. Whether the
margin will nonetheless be'sufficient to sustain a profitable volume of business for the mail
order entrepreneur, and to sustain the allegiance of the price conscious consumer remains
to be disclosed.
1. 38 Misc. 2d 476, 237 N.Y.S.2d 109 (Sup. Ct. 1963) (Lawless, J.).
2. Id. at 478, 237 N.Y.S.2d at 111.
3. Ibid.
